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THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND THE
RULES OF WAR IN THE POST-9/11
AND IRAQ WORLD
KEYNOTE ADDRESS
WILLIAM

H. TAFT*

To begin with, I would like to thank American University's
Washington College of Law and the International Law Review for
putting on this conference. The subject-The Geneva Convention
and the Rules of War in the post-9/11 World and in Iraq-could not
be more timely and potentially useful. We are at a point now where
we have enough experience in the war the terrorists are fighting
against us to know how it is being fought by them and needs to be
defended against by us. Specifically, we now have a fair idea of how
this conflict varies from both traditional wars and normal law
enforcement operations-the two familiar structures through which
uses of force against civil societies have been customarily dealt with.
We need to take the knowledge our experience has given us to
establish a new system whose rules are well understood and take
account of both the need to protect our citizens and assure that we
accurately identify, effectively deter, and appropriately punish those
who pose threats to our society or have committed criminal acts. This
conference can make an important contribution to this effort.
During the course of the day, I have no doubt the various panels
will be exploring the issues implicit in the assignment I have
described in detail. In this short keynote address, I will try just to
make a few general points that I hope will assist in that work.
. Of Counsel, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson; formerly, Legal
Advisor,
Department of State, Deputy Secretary and General Counsel, Department of
Defense.
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At the outset, let me declare my own preference for using the law
of war rather than traditional criminal law as at least the starting
point for any new system of rules for dealing with the terrorist
challenge we currently confront. In saying this, I do not exclude that
a better day may come when nations may be able to protect their
citizens effectively through traditional law enforcement methods, but
at the moment it does not seem to me that such an approach will
succeed or properly takes account of the nature and extent of the
threat.
Al Qaeda is not simply a criminal enterprise that uses violence to
achieve particular, limited material objectives. Its objectives, insofar
as they can be determined from its actions and the statements of its
leaders, are essentially political and amount to nothing less than the
overthrow of recognized governments and the destruction of as much
of civil society as it can manage in certain states, including the
United States. Moreover, it pursues its political objectives in ways
that are the ways of war, not the ways of crime. Al Qaeda, of course,
is not a state, but nor is it simply the Red Brigades or even the IRA
and the Basque movement with their specific goals to change the
policy of a single national state. Al Qaeda's program addresses itself
directly to the conduct of national governments around the world. Its
methods, moreover, are the methods of war, and the scale and
international character of its activity are similarly familiar to us only
in war.
Finally, on our side it is clear that the deployment of our own
armed forces and the conduct of military operations are essential to
deal with al Qaeda and its affiliate terrorist groups. In short, as was
clearly recognized by our allies and the unanimous vote of the
United Nations Security Council immediately after the attacks on
September 11, 2001, we are engaged in an armed conflict. While it is
undoubtedly true that this armed conflict with al Qaeda has its
unconventional aspects, the law of armed conflict modified to adapt
to those unconventional aspects appears to me to be the best place to
start.
I mentioned just now what I believe should be the purposes of the
set of rules we apply in dealing with al Qaeda-the effective
protection of our citizens and the need to assure that we accurately
identify, effectively deter, and appropriately punish the terrorists who
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are fighting us. With regard to each of these purposes, the law of
armed conflict provides several distinct advantages over traditional
law enforcement approaches.
First, the law of armed conflict authorizes the detention and
interrogation of persons who may have critically important
information about terrorists' plans and capabilities. While detained
persons are not, of course, required to provide information and
certainly may not be coerced into doing so, experience suggests that
many of them will do so voluntarily or, perhaps as often,
inadvertently, and this can save many lives. Because under the law of
war it is not necessary to provide detained persons with lawyers,
advise them of their rights to remain silent or charge them with any
crime-they may not, after all, have committed one-they are more
likely to provide vital intelligence information than would be the
case in a law enforcement setting. The law of war, which
traditionally has immunized lawful combatants for acts that in other
contexts would be criminal, recognizes that a belligerent's interest in
gaining intelligence may outweigh his interest in prosecuting
individual members of the opposing force for criminal acts-apart,
of course, from war crimes, which present a special case. The same
balance of interests would seem to apply in the conflict with
terrorists.
A second area where the traditional law of war seems to
correspond well with the balance of interests in the conflict with al
Qaeda concerns the right to detain persons who, if they are released,
will re-engage in the fight. Again, the law of war recognizes that it is
not necessary to charge a detained person with a crime to keep him
off the battlefield while hostilities continue. Preventing his further
participation in the conflict will, presumably, hasten its end and
could significantly reduce the risk of additional casualties to our
population. Such preventive detention obviously has no place in our
concept of criminal law enforcement, but it has long been accepted in
the law of war and, again, seems sensibly to apply to the conflict
with al Qaeda.
A third advantage of applying the law of war to the conflict with al
Qaeda is that it embodies an established set of rules for the conduct
of our own troops. It immunizes them for various acts involving the
use of force that in a law enforcement context would not be
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permitted, at the same time as it prohibits acts that unnecessarily
endanger non-combatants; it assures detained combatants of humane
treatment; it provides a basis for charging terrorists for war crimes
and holding them accountable for how they treat our servicemen who
fall into their hands. Our troops, moreover, are trained to comply
with the law of war in conducting operations. Inasmuch as the
terrorists can only be defeated by our armed forces, discarding
familiar rules of conduct and improvising new ones as we go along
creates a situation full of temptations to cut comers and adopt
practices that seem desirable at the moment but are not well thought
through and are bad precedents for other situations that we fail to
anticipate.
On the whole, then, it seems to me that, for these and other
reasons, the law of armed conflict provides the best foundation for a
system governing the war the terrorists have declared and are
pursuing against us. However, in applying it to this new type of war
with non-state actors operating in a loose, erratically disciplined
structure, we need to recognize that this war varies in important
respects from the state-against-state wars for which the law of war
was designed, and we should be prepared to make appropriate
modifications to accommodate the differences. Two points, in
particular, stand out in this regard, both of them having to do with
detention of enemy combatants.
First, we need to exercise great care in taking persons into custody
in the first place to assure that they are indeed enemy combatants. In
the traditional state-against-state war this is generally not difficult.
The enemy wears his country's uniform, has a rank and serial
number he is obliged and typically pleased to specify, and is assigned
to a regular military unit. Most often he is captured in the course of
actual combat, leaving no doubt as to his status. In the war the
terrorists are fighting, the situation is much less clear. Persons are
handed over to our forces by third parties whose reports about the
circumstances of capture are not always reliable; they do not wear
uniforms or other identifying insignia; and they are often arrested on
the basis of information that they are plotting terrorist events while
they sit in their apartments far from the battlefield rather than in a
national Ministry of Defense. In short, in all these circumstances it is
a lot more difficult to be sure that persons we suspect are terrorists
actually are enemy combatants who may be detained. It appears now,
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in fact, that not many, but at least a few, of the persons detained in
Guantanamo for more than two years were not properly classified as
combatants and should never have been sent there at all. Errors occur
in war, of course, and often with tragic consequences, but it is hard
not to think that providing an individualized determination of each
individual's status at the time of capture rather than waiting until the
Supreme Court required this years later would have avoided some
mistakes and, perhaps incidentally, would have increased public
support both at home and abroad for detaining enemy combatants
while the war with al Qaeda continues.
Second, there is the issue of how long an individual detainee may
be held while the conflict with al Qaeda continues. In view of the
fact that the conflict may extend indefinitely, there has been concern
that persons who have not been charged with any crime may
nonetheless be effectively imprisoned for life because a war in which
they were perhaps only briefly involved when they were young has
not ended. People expressing this concern in this way-and there are
many of them-evidently do not accept that the law of war,
permitting detention of combatants while hostilities continue, is the
applicable body of law for the conflict with al Qaeda. Nonetheless,
even assuming as I do that it is, the situation, in my judgment, calls
for another adjustment to the practice of holding captured enemy
combatants until the end of hostilities under the traditional law of
war to reflect the special circumstances of the war with al Qaeda.
The traditional rule assumed that the belligerent state had the
ability both to initiate the war and require its citizens to participate in
it and, subsequently, to end hostilities by ordering its forces to
surrender. Military discipline would enforce each decision in its turn.
In this situation, the consequences of repatriating captured
combatants, whether during hostilities or after, were clear: persons
repatriated while hostilities continued would rejoin their country's
forces, and those repatriated later would have no war to fight in and
thus present no danger. The key consideration here, of course, is
simply whether the released detainee will rejoin the fight. Rather
than seeking the answer to this question in the formal position of a
belligerent state, however, in the war with the terrorists it would
seem that a periodic individual assessment of a detainee's intentions
is appropriate. This is the approach reflected in the annual review
board process recently established for Guantanamo detainees.
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There remains the important question of what rules should govern
the treatment of enemy combatants captured in this new type of war.
It seems clear that, strictly speaking, the Geneva Conventions do not
apply to a conflict with al Qaeda, a non-state and a non-party to the
Conventions. While it is less clear, it is likely that in most cases even
if the Conventions did apply, the terrorist combatants in this conflict
do not qualify for treatment as prisoners of war because of their
failure to comply with the laws of war.
None of this is to say, however, that the Conventions' general
requirement that detained persons not be subjected to cruel,
inhumane or humiliating treatment is not a sound guideline. If we are
to use the law of war as the point of departure for the system to be
used in this new type of war, there ought in any event to be some
particular justification-or at least some practical benefit-for
departing from this guideline. It is significant that, seeing no such
justification or benefit when they were considering this issue initially
in January of 2002, neither the military nor the civilian leadership of
the Department of Defense proposed to deviate from the
requirements of the Geneva Conventions in their treatment of the
detainees in Guantanamo. The original rules of engagement issued to
the forces fighting in Afghanistan had rather directed that the Geneva
Conventions be complied with in the treatment of persons taken into
custody, regardless of whether they were, strictly speaking, entitled
to this. In this respect they followed the American practice in
Vietnam, where the Viet Cong were treated in accordance with the
Conventions even though it was understood that this was not
required.
It has been a continuing source of amazement and, I may add,
considerable disappointment to me that, notwithstanding the stated
intention of the Pentagon's leadership to comply with the
requirements of the Conventions without qualification, lawyers at the
Department of Justice thought it was important to decide at that time
that the Conventions did not apply to al Qaeda as a matter of law and
to qualify the commitment to apply them as a matter of policy to
situations where this was "appropriate' and "consistent with military
necessity." This unsought conclusion unhinged those responsible for
the treatment of the detainees in Guantanamo from the legal
guidelines for interrogation of detainees reflected in the Conventions
and embodied in the Army Field Manual for decades. Set adrift in
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uncharted waters and under pressure from their leaders to develop
information on the plans and practices of al Qaeda, it was predictable
that those managing the interrogation would eventually go too far,
and news reports now indicate that from time to time this happened.
I do not exclude that some important information-perhaps very
important, life-saving information-may have resulted from the
application of methods of interrogation that are prohibited by the
Conventions and the Manual. I would note, however, that in adopting
any new system authorizing such methods, some justification beyond
declaring that unlawful combatants have no rights or that the laws of
war prohibiting the use of such methods do not apply to our conflict
with al Qaeda would be highly desirable. This would seem to be a
job for Congress, but perhaps this conference can make a start.
Before ending, I should mention one more area where there is
some work to be done. The International Committee of the Red
Cross ("ICRC") and several human rights advocacy groups have on a
number of occasions publicly raised concerns about other alleged
deviations from the customary law of war as it relates to the
treatment of detainees in our conflict with al Qaeda. Specifically, the
ICRC has alleged that the United States is holding persons whose
identities have not been declared to the ICRC, that it is operating
undisclosed detention facilities and arranging unlawful transfers of
detainees to third countries. There is no basis in the law of war,
criminal law or human rights law for such practices. Nor is it tenable
after the Supreme Court's rulings last summer to assert that detainees
have no legal rights of any kind, that they may not contest with the
assistance of competent counsel of their own choosing the legal basis
of their detention, that the government has complete discretion to
determine the conditions of their detention, or that whether they are
treated humanely or not is a question only of policy. How our
government treats people should never, at bottom, be a matter merely
of policy, but a matter of law.
This conference will have served a most useful purpose if it begins
to identify what that law should be. I wish you good luck in your
important work.

